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And Promises to Keep:
The Future in Employment Discrimination
JULIA C. LAMBER*

INTRODUCTION
Invited to look forward on the occasion of the School of Law's 150th
birthday, I look backward first. In order to understand what the twenty-first
century holds for the field of employment discrimination, I need to recall its
history When I was a law student more than twenty years ago, there was no
field of law called employment discrimination. The premise of my student
note,' a walk through Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 2 seems quaint.
The piece was written more than seven years after Congress had passed Title
VII, prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex,
religion, and national origin, but shortly before the United States Supreme
Court ruled that a state statute classifying on the basis of gender was
unconstitutional.3 Now, in my office, I have a looseleaf reporter service with
nearly sixty volumes devoted solely to employment discrimination cases.
Overt discrimination, if not commonplace, was not unusual during my
student days. I was one of nine women in my class, more than double the
number of women students in the class ahead of ours. I still remember a time
during my third year of law school when a male friend and I were walking to
class. He turned to me and said, "Don't you feel bad?" "About what?" I
responded. "Taking the place of a man in law school." 4 Interview season was
particularly stressful. One large law firm from Chicago decided to interview
me (and the other woman candidate) on a Saturday morning rather than during
the normal weekday times. I not only willingly aquiesced, I also allowed the
interviewer to lecture me on the inappropriateness of my desire to represent
professional athletes in labor negotiations (even though I am the nuttiest
sports fan, and it was a great labor law firm). "Besides," he said, "you
wouldn't really like it."
Of course, things were worse 150 years ago. Women and African-Americans
did not have the right to vote or the right to practice law; slavery was lawful

* Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Women's Studies, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1.Julia Lamber, Note, EqualRightsfor Women: The Needfor a NationalPolicy, 46 IND. L.J. 373
(1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
3. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
4. At a dinner party recently, I heard similar stones from two of the other seven female guests.
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in some states; and married women could not own property in their own
names. We have indeed come a long way- Today, more than twenty-five
percent of our first-year class are minority group members. In the United
States, women now comprise approximately twenty percent of the legal
profession.'
In Title VII, Congress made a commitment to eliminate discrimination in
the workplace. However, Congress has never defined what it meant by
discrimination nor articulated its vision of equality by which one could
measure success or compliance. Many of the important cases in twenty-five
years of Title VII litigation turn on what is the right kind of evidence, or even
more formalistically, what is the right order of proof, without focusing on the
significance of that evidence in any systematic way 6 This failure reflects our
collective ambivalent attitude toward employment discrimination, or
discrimination in general: It is easy to have an opinion about discrimination
if one does not have to think about it very hard.
I. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF RIGHTS UNDER TITLE VII
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has rendered several
unanimous decisions that adopt an expansive interpretation of the rights
protected by Title VII. Two recent cases stand out: Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson7 and UAW v Johnson Controls.8 In the early 1970s, there was no
recognized cause of action for what we now call sexual harassment. Early
cases found that such conduct was not properly considered under Title VII.
The claim was dismissed under one or more of the following theories: (1)
Congress never intended such a cause of action;9 (2) state tort law provided
a remedy; 0 (3) the possibility of a bisexual supervisor making advances to
both sexes illustrated the folly of considering sexual overtures to be gender
discrimination; 1 or (4) the pervasiveness of sexual consideration and
advances in the workplace meant too many federal lawsuits. 2 In addition,
the behavior in question was considered personal, not professional.

5. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 36 EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGs 183
(Jan. 1989).
6. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
8. I11 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
9. Susan Estnch, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 818 (1990).
10. Id. at 818.
11. Id. at 819.
12. Id. at 820.
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In 1986, the Supreme Court held in Vinson that nondiscrimination under
Title VII included the right to be free from "unwelcome sexual advances that
"s13 While we might
create an offensive or hostile working environment
question why it took so long for the Court to recognize sexual harassment as
a form of gender discrimination, the important fact is that it did, and in a
unanimous opinion. The Court rejected strict liability of the employer, but it
also rejected the employer's argument that failure to notify the employer or
failure to use a grievance procedure would insulate the employer. 4 My
primary objection to the Vinson opinion was the Court's failure to see that the
early reasons articulated to exclude sexual harassment from gender discrimination claims were the very reasons to include it as a cause of action under Title
VII."
In Johnson Controls, female plaintiffs challenged an employer's policy of
excluding women from jobs that involved exposure to substances known or
suspected of causing harm to fetuses. Similar exclusions were common under
early twentieth-century state protective legislation. That legislation was
justified in terms of harm to women's reproductive functions. 6 Today's fetal
protection policies are justified on the basis of moral qualms about endangering the health of children. While the scientific evidence does not support the
exclusionary policies of the early twentieth-century state protective laws, no
one scoffs at the prospect of injury to future children who cannot protect
themselves or participate in the decisions that will govern their lives. The
Supreme Court upheld early state protection legislation against challenges that
they were unconstitutional. 7 By contrast, the Court in Johnson Controls
struck down these policies.'8 In this case, the process used by Johnson
Controls to make batteries involved exposure to excessive levels of lead. And
we are suspicious of employers who assert their ethical feelings at the expense
of women. The Title VII question for the Supreme Court was whether this
employer's interest in the health of unborn children met the "bona fide

13. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64.
14. Id. at 72.
15. For a discussion of sexual harassment claims, see Estrich, supra note 9, at 818-23, and Kathryn
Abrams, GenderDiscriminationand the Transformationof Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183
(1989). Both include citations to the voluminous literature on sexual harassment.
16. The most famous case is Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding constitutionality
of maximum hours legislation for women only).
17. See, e.g., id.
18. The parallels between earlier state protective legislation and modem fetal protection policies are
explored in Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies,53 U. CHi. L. REV.
1219 (1986); Wendy W. Williams, Firingthe Woman to Protectthe Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title V1, 69 GEO. L.J 641 (1981).
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occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception to the statute.19 Construing
the
20
exception very narrowly, the Court was unanimous that it did not.
II. EROSION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
In contrast to these decisions adopting an expansive interpretation of the
rights protected by Title VII, the Supreme Court has in recent years rendered
several opinions that erode the doctrinal and analytical underpinnings of the
disparate impact theory The. Court itself established the disparate impact
theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 ' Rejecting the view of the lower courts
that Title VII prohibited only intentional discrimination, the Griggs Court held
that Title VII proscribes "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. '22 Thus, disparate impact claims involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another. An employer's only defense was
that the disparate impact was justified by business necessity 23 Subsequent
to Griggs, litigants and courts often confronted the issue of the scope of the
business necessity defense. Essentially there were two questions: (1) Is there
a substantial relationship between the neutral hiring criterion and the
employer's stated purpose?, and (2) Is the employer's interest in using a
particular criterion sufficiently important given its adverse effect on members
of a protected group?24
By 1989, with the Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 2 many observers concluded that disparate impact was no longer a
viable theory under Title VII. In Wards Cove, the Court held that the plaintiff
could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination by comparing the
racial composition of the "cannery" workforce, which was essentially
unskilled and filled by nonwhites, with the "noncannery" workforce, which

19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
20. The Court split on whether any policy would meet this exception. A majority of the Court said
that the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is limited to those situations where a woman
cannot efficiently perform her job; in fetal protection cases everyone agrees she can. Johnson Controls,
I1I S. Ct. at 1207. The concurrence thought this reading too narrow. For them, excessive costs to the
employer could be a defense. Id. at 1210.
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Id. at 431.

23. Id.

24. Mark S. Brodin, Costs,Profits, and EqualEmployment Opportunity, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
318,337-43 (1987); Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the DisproportionateEffects StandardofLiability
in Title VllLitigation, 46 U. PiTr. L. REv. 555, 591-94 (1985); Julia Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged
Employee Selection Criteria: The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in DisparateImpact Cases

Under Title VII, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1, 34-41.
25. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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was skilled and filled by whites. The Court additionally undercut the utility
of the disparate impact theory by imposing a specific causation requirement
on the plaintiff2 6 and reducing the defendant's burden on the issue of
business necessity 27

III. THE FUTURE
A. More of the Same: The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Primarily in response to the decision in Wards Cove (and others decided
that same term that also weakened the effectiveness of Title VII), 28 Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.29 Overruling Wards Cove was so
integral to the congressional action that the stated purpose of the Act mentions
both Wards Cove and Griggs by name.3 0 An additional purpose of the 1991
Act was to provide monetary damages for intentional discrimination and
unlawful harassment. 31 This damage award is a direct consequence of the
Court's 1986 recognition that sexual harassment is a form of gender
discrimination under Title VII. 32 Once the Court recognized that cause of
action, the inadequacy of Title VII's equitable remedies was obvious. The
damage remedy will have a profound but unknown impact on future Title VII
litigation because these claims will now be tried before a jury Ironically, it
was the civil rights organizations who opposed jury trials during consideration

of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, just as it was the civil rights organizations who
26. Id. at 656-58 (finding that plaintiff must isolate and identify the specific employment practices
that are allegedly responsible for any observed disparity).
27. Id. at 659-61 (reducing the inquiry into whether a practice serves a legitimate business reason
and shifting the burden to the plaintiff to show that the requirement was not justified).
28. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989) (limiting the scope of section
1981); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,239-52 (1989) (establishing standards for evaluating
mixed-motive employment discrimination claims); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-55 (substantially
undercutting the disparate impact theory ofdiscnmination the Court enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 766-68 (1989) (broadening the right
of white employees and applicants to challenge affirmative action plans in consent decrees); Lorance
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 904-13 (1989) (requiring discriminatory intent for
allegations of sex discrimination in seniority systems); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Il1 S.
Ct. 1227, 1230-36 (1991) (holding that Title VII does not have extraterritonal effect); West Virginia
Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1140-48 (1991) (limiting the availability of expert witness fees
to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318-20 (1986)
(finding U.S. government not liable for interest on Title VII judgements).
29. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections
of U.S.C.).
30. Id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
31. Id.
32. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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pushed for them in 1991. Obviously, the calculation of whom to trust to
balance the interest of employers and employees has changed over the years.
In contrast to these definite, intended changes in how Title VII cases will
be litigated, the effect of the provision overruling Wards Cove is less clear.
In the 1991 Act, Congress intended to codify the concepts of "business
necessity" and "job-relatedness" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs
and in the other decisions prior to Wards Cove.33 Congress also intended to
provide guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact claims. The statute
provides that plaintiffs can establish a disparate impact claim if they prove
that "a particular employment practice" causes a disparate impact and the
employer fails to prove that the challenged practice is both "job related" and
consistent with "business necessity ,34
This language apparently achieves two goals of those who sought to
neutralize the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove. First, the employer,
not the plaintiff, has the burden of showing that the employment practice is
justified in the face of its adverse impact. Second, the employer's burden is
considerable, requiring it to show both the employment practice's relationship
to the job in question and the importance of the employment practice to the
employer. Thus, this language resolves some issues that are often raised in
disparate impact cases, such as the relationship between job-relatedness and
business necessity on the one hand and the relationship between business
necessity and the BFOQ defense on the other.35 The language does little,
however, in setting a standard by which to decide whether a practice is "job
related" or "consistent with business necessity"
How these provisions are implemented will preoccupy litigants, courts, and
scholars for some time. Besides the statutory language, Congress did not tell
us very much. The agreed-upon exclusive piece of legislative history
concerning Wards Cove provides that "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and
'job related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions

33. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
34. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1991).
The plaintiff can also establish a claim of disparate impact by showing that there is an alterative
employment practice that serves the employer's purpose and the employer refuses to adopt it. Id. §
703(k)(1)(A)(ii).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(k)(2) provides that business necessity may not be used as a
defense against a claim of intentional discnmination. The BFOQ exception, § 703(e)(1), provides a
defense to discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, and national origin "in those certain instances
where sex, religion, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business
" Id.
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prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. ' '3 6 In codifying the law as it
existed before Wards Cove, all Congress accomplished was to adopt the messy
state of the disparate impact theory, the business necessity defense, and the
relevance of alternative employment practices.3 7 It does seem clear that in
the future "business necessity" will provide the context in which to work out
the question of how far we are willing to intrude on individual autonomy in
order to stamp out discrimination. My point is simply that these were and will
continue to be hotly contested issues. Legislative agreement was forged by
continuing our ambiguous commitment to equality in the 1991 statute. 8
B. Something Different: Feminist Jurisprudence
When thinking about the effects of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the future
looks very much like the past. One gets a different sense, however, about the
future of employment discrimination by taking notice of a new direction in
scholarship and its theoretical underpinnings. In 1964, when Congress
considered Title VII, the overriding notion of equality was that blacks and
whites, and therefore presumably women and men, should be treated the same
for nearly all employment decisions. The harms of discrimination in
employment were overt exclusions because of prejudice or bias and the use
of irrational stereotypes that did not allow individuals to be judged on their
own merits.
The goal of Title VII was to remove artificial barriers to employment,
opening previously closed jobs or careers. The result has been more women
in traditionally male-dominated fields, such as law, medicine, science, and
publishing. But this goal does not do much to address issues of special
concern to women, such as pregnancy or childrearing leaves. It does little to
change existing workplace norms that may be inhospitable to women. It does
nothing to address the concerns of women who do not want to be pathbreakers, tokens, or one of the few in male-dominated jobs.
It is clear that the notion of equality that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s
is not sufficient to eliminate gender discrimination in the workplace, nor is it
effective in addressing the reality of women's lives. In response, feminist
legal theorists ask how the workplace can accommodate women. A primary

36. 137 CONG. REc. S 15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (citations omitted). The exclusive nature of

this legislative history is provided for in Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075.
37. See supra sources cited in note 24.
38. The significance of the 1991 Act is further complicated because President Bush's willingness
to sign it rather than veto it, as he did the year previously, is probably explained better by the political
fallout from the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and David Duke's showing in the Louisiana
gubernatonal race than by any legislative changes in the Act addressing his previous concerns.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:857

focus of this inquiry has been to acknowledge the differences between men
and women and among women themselves. Additionally, these theorists ask
whether Title VII allows or requires employers to take such differences into
account if they relate to job qualifications or the workplace more generally
There are many controversies within this scholarly literature and whether we
achieve meaningful equality in the twenty-first century is dependent upon
working out these controversies.3
Feminist legal theory has already transformed the debate about the
analytical puzzle posed by pregnancy 40 But the prevalence of male models
of behavior, especially male models of success, continue. It is important to
understand, for example, why so many women join major law firms
throughout the country only to quit, and often withdraw from the workforce
altogether, before they become partners. We need to understand why,
assuming a woman stays at the firm, she finds it necessary to give birth on
Friday and return to the office on Monday "
Incorporating lessons of feminist legal theory into Title VII jurisprudence
means that we will think about gender separately from other forms of
discrimination. In the past, we tended to lump all forms of discrimination
together. It was important to see the similarities between race and gender
discrimination, to interpret the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
196742 in line with Title VII, and to model anti-discrimination provisions for
the disabled on Title VII. 43 Now, it is crucial to recognize our differences.

39. For a recent bibliography, see Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal
Scholarship:A Bibliography,77 IowA L. REv. 87 (1991). For two recent examples, see Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
40. See, for example, the debate within feminist legal circles over what position to take when the
Supreme Court considered California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987), involving leaves for women only. CompareWendy W Williams, Equality'sRiddle: Pregnancy
and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (19841985) (discussing equal treatment approach) with Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality,
75 CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (discussing difference approach). See also THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990); Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F 115.
41. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem " Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1764-68 (1991); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work:
JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
43. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. 11 1990).
Ironically, the legislative provisions adopted in the 1991 Civil Rights Act about the disparate impact
theory are lifted from the provisions in the Americans with Disabilities Act. Compare § 703(k) of the
1991 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991), with § 12,112(b) of the ADA. The enforcement
provisions in the ADA, though, are those found in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a).

